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Introduction
Recently, energy security in Western Europe seems to be at risk. Around the turn of the year 2005/2006, the Russian freezing of natural gas exports to the Ukraine led to a European gas crisis. This triggered off intensive debates about energy security all over Europe (cp. e.g. Economist, 2006) . Apart from this singular gas transmission crisis, ongoing political interventions in the Russian energy sector and general political instability in the Ukraine constantly give reason for serious concerns about energy security in Western Europe (Helm, 2005) . Subsequently to the gas crisis in 2006, concerns about a stable oil supply were especially put forward by the (quite similar) Russian suspension of oil deliveries to Western Europe via Belarus in early 2007.
The relevance of this issue for Europe is even more apparent in the light of the striking energy dependence on Russian resources. In 2005, 20 per cent of the gas consumed in Western Europe stemmed from Russia and was transmitted via Ukrainian soil. Additionally, the global rise in energy demand due to the fast economic growth in Asia makes energy security an essential challenge for Western Europe (Correljé and van der Linde, 2006) . What is more, the current period is shaped by the rise in importance of gas as the main source of new electricitygeneration capacity (cp. Foss, 2005) .
In the past decades, the scientific debate about energy security focused on possible implications for competitiveness at an economy-wide level as well as for politics (cp. e.g. Toman, 1993 , LaCasse and Plourde, 1995 , Zweifel and Bonomo, 1995 , and Helm, 2005 .
Less discussed in academic contributions, however, is the question whether energy security has an impact on single sectors or companies that depend on a stable and secure resource supply. In this respect, it is straightforward to ask how utilities and companies operating or trading with natural gas are affected by changes in the environment of energy security. For this group, effects are not yet empirically analyzed. As the natural resource is the foundation of energy-related companies' business, supply crises could, on the one hand, induce insecurity and have a negative effect on their business prospects. On the other hand, however, it seems to be possible that those companies would profit from such supply crises if they could realize windfall profits, e.g. due to rising resource prices.
Using an event study approach, we assess whether or not the Russian announcement of suspension of gas deliveries, this suspension itself as well as its withdrawal affected (a) the volatility and (b) the level of West European utilities' as well as oil and gas companies' stock returns. Therefore, the contribution of this paper is twofold: Besides putting the phenomenon of energy security on the agenda of economists dealing with financial markets, it should contribute to the methodological enhancements of event studies in the field of resource, energy and environmental economics. To our knowledge, this is the first paper in the field that assesses event impacts on return volatility. However, it is obvious that volatility is an important issue in financial markets and, to be precise, in stock attractiveness for potential investors (cp. e.g. Engle, 2004 ). Given a certain return level, risk-averse investors will prefer the equity with the lowest volatility. Furthermore, we are not familiar with any event study in this field that generally considers autoregressive conditional heteroskedasticity -although the GARCH-class has become standard in financial econometrics subsequent to Bollerslev's (1986) seminal paper. Consequently, event-induced volatility and security-specific volatility effects have been ignored here for the calculation and significance testing of abnormal returns. This analysis aims at starting to fill this gap.
The remainder of this paper is structured as follows: Section 2 gives an overview of the 2006 European gas crisis, the event to be analysed in this study. In Section 3 we review the related literature while Section 4 introduces the methodological approach chosen. Our data basis and important features of our analysis are presented in Section 5. Section 6 reports the results, section 7 concludes. 3 Alternatively to this price increase, Gazprom demanded the licence for an equity stake in the Ukrainian transit pipeline network (Stern, 2006b ).
The 2006 European Gas Crisis -An Overview
Gazprom followed through with its threat and suspended gas deliveries on New Year's Day,
2006
. The same day, the Ukrainian utility MOT declared that Russian deliveries had decreased by 25 per cent. In Central and West European countries, gas deliveries declined consequently, emphasizing the overall European dimension of the gas crisis. On January 2, 11
European countries reported a cutback of gas deliveries due to reduced feeding-in from Russia. The drop was not negligible, e.g. reaching losses of about one third of usual deliveries in Austria, 25 per cent in France and Italy, as well as of unknown size in Germany, the largest European economy (Stern, 2006b) . At the APX, London, gas prices rose by more than 10 per cent. Even in the daytime of January 3, a normalization of Russian gas deliveries was not reached. While the gas price at the APX did not stop rising, the cutback of gas supply had consequences for the trading of resources other than gas, for example oil, and electricity at West European exchanges as well: The price of WTI rose by about 3 per cent; Brent prices reached their 3-month peak. Furthermore, German electricity prices at the EEX, Leipzig, were about 50 per cent higher than at the turn of the year. Moreover, the Gazprom share reached a record high when the Russian stock market reopened, indicating that Gazprom-investors appreciated the crisis (Stern, 2006a) . Consequently, we label the trading days between January 1, and January 3, i.e. January 2, as the crisis period (day).
However, in the course of January 3, Russia turned the supply to the Ukraine back on.
Consequently, the gas shortages in Western Europe were removed. A legal (preliminary) compromise in the conflict was reached on January 4. The agreement set the price for Russian gas deliveries that the Ukraine had to face from 2006 on at 95 dollars, the transit price for Russian gas through the Ukraine rose from 1.09 to 1.65 dollars. Resource prices at the international exchanges, as well as European electricity prices remained at a high level, although, following Stern (2006b) , there were no indications of continuous gas delivery shortages after January 4. In the empirical analysis of this paper, trading days from January 3, to January 5 are taken as the period when the crisis was resolved and withdrawn.
Literature Review
Event studies are particularly applied in finance and accounting, for example, to examine the effects of mergers and acquisitions, earnings announcements, or issues of new debt or equity (MacKinley, 1997, Kothari and Warner, 2006) . However, they are increasingly used to analyze news related to resource, energy, and environmental economics. Those studies can roughly be subdivided into three different groups: Event studies considering (1) disclosures of information regarding positive or negative corporate environmental performance (Dasgupta et al., 2001 , Gupta and Goldar, 2005 , Capelle-Blancard and Laguna, 2007 , (2) environmental news related to regulations concerning energy and the environment (Lanoie et al., 1998 , Karpoff et al., 2005 , Dasgupta et al., 2006 , and (3) direct effects of regulation.
There are relatively few event studies which form this third group. This is due to the fact that regulation generally rather refers to a process than to a surprising event that may be analysed using the event study technique. If information has been available before the event, which is often the case, abnormal returns should not occur as the news is already priced in by the financial markets. Many of those studies have important features in common with our own analysis: Often, electric utility stocks are analysed (Butler and McNertney, 1991 , Diltz, 2002 , Kahn and Knittel, 2003 , Oberndorfer and Ziegler, 2006 . Besides that, those papers have in common with the assessment conducted here that they assess the influence of a general shock related to resource, energy, or environmental economics on stock returns. Results from those papers remain inconclusive, indicating that regulation does not affect financial markets as a rule. To our knowledge, there is no event study available that assesses the impact of energy supply shortages on stock returns.
However, some, although only few empirical work on the interrelationship between resource prices -price shocks that may due to energy supply crises -and financial markets exists.
Using quarterly data, Jones and Kaul (1996) find that the impact of oil shocks on US and Canadian stock returns do not exceed an equivalent impact of real cash flow changes, while for Japanese and UK stocks, oil shock impacts are larger than the respective real cash flow impacts would justify. Sadorsky (1999) shows within a VAR framework that oil prices as well as oil price volatility play an important role for stock returns. Hayo and Kutan (2005) find that the oil price has a positive impact on Russian stock returns. Energy news seems to effect on the Russian bond market, while no impact on financial market volatility can be measured.
Similarly, Huang et al. (1996) report a significant and positive correlation between the returns of US oil stocks and (current and lagged) oil futures returns. The authors attribute this sign of the correlation to the fact that oil companies could benefit from increases in oil prices. This result is consistent with the findings of Boyer and Filion (2007) who show that the stock returns of Canadian oil and gas companies is positively associated with oil and gas prices.
Methodologically, to our knowledge, all event studies in the field of resource, energy, or environmental economics focus on the impacts of the respective event on stock returns.
Against this background, this is the first paper in this field that, besides looking at stock returns, assesses event impacts on unsystematic return volatility. It is obvious that volatility is an important issue in financial markets and, to be precise, in stock attractiveness for potential investors. Given a certain return level, risk-averse investors will prefer the equity with lowest volatility (cp. e.g. Engle, 2004) . Furthermore, we are not familiar with any event study in our field that generally considers autoregressive conditional heteroskedasticity -although the GARCH-class has become standard in financial econometrics -or even event-induced volatility (and, what is more, security-specific volatility effects) for the calculation and significance testing of abnormal returns. Using simulation technique, Savickas (2003) shows that traditional tests are misspecified in the presence of event-induced volatility.
Methodology

In this article, we want to analyze the impact of the 2006 European gas crisis on West
European utilities from a stock market perspective using event study techniques. This is a very reliable approach for measuring impacts on their business prospects since, given the existence of efficient financial markets, stock prices constitute the best possible estimate of the net present value of discounted cash flows (Fama, 1970) . Furthermore, measuring the economic impact of such a short-dated crisis is very difficult if the analysis is not based on daily data. For indicators of business prospects other than stock prices or returns, such as exports, sales, Tobin's Q, or return on assets, daily data are not available. The methodological approach of this event study analysis is twofold: First, we want to analyse if the Russian suspension of gas deliveries, the announcement of this suspension as well as its withdrawal had an effect on unsystematic volatility of European energy stocks. Secondly, we want to measure event effects on stock returns, taking volatility and especially possible event-induced volatility into account.
First, we employ the approach formulated by Hilliard and Savickas (2003) in order to test for event-induced abnormal unsystematic volatility in the stock returns. The authors use a standard GARCH(1,1) (one-factor) model as a baseline. Models of the GARCH-class (Bollerslev, 1986) are very appealing approaches for the analysis of high-frequent time series in financial markets. Reason for this is the fact that they, in contrast to linear estimation techniques, address the so-called volatility clustering, the tendency that current volatility of asset prices tends to be positively correlated with its past values. Amongst those approaches, the use of the GARCH(1,1) model is widespread as it generally sufficiently explains systematic variation of asset price volatility (Akgiray, 1989 , Andersen and Bollerslev, 1998 , Engle, 2001 , although meanwhile numerous modifications have been proposed. The one-factor model (inspired by the so-called market model) in the GARCH(1,1) form can be formulated as
where r i,t is the stock return for firm i in the period t, and r m,t is the return of the market portfolio, respectively. The error term t At an event day t, two different types of factors may determine the level of unsystematic volatility: Security-specific factors are captured by the model formulated above (e.g. correlation with the market, volatility dynamics). Event-specific factors, however, form part
ε , but are ignored in the conditional variance h i,t . The impact of event-specific factors can not adequately be captured by simply looking at the respective error terms as in such a setting; they can not be separated from security-specific factors.
Those event-specific factors, however, can be measured by the ratio λ t of the cross-sectional variance of the estimated residuals from the one-factor model (1) and its conditional variance implied by the GARCH process. The parameter λ t that is positive as a rule measures the event effect at time t on volatility in a manner that it indicates the multiple by which the unsystematic volatility increases from its no-event level, i.e. λ t =1 indicates that the event has 
with N denominating the number of assets analysed. The t i, ε s and the s are taken from the estimation of equation (1) and (2) for the respective firm i. The estimator of the cumulative abnormal return volatility for an event window between the days k and m is the sum of the individual estimators:
The null hypothesis of
, respectively, can then be tested using
where under H 0 , the test statistic is χ
In order to assess whether the gas crisis had an impact on stock returns, i.e. if abnormal returns occurred due to this event, we use the approach suggested by Savickas (2003) . Given the fact that it addresses both conditionally heteroskedastic behaviour of volatility as well as possible event-induced variance increases it is a very robust method. Furthermore, it does not require the conditional volatility to be the same across firms analysed. These are very appealing features making Savickas' approach superior to well-established methods (e.g. Brown and Warner, 1980 and 1985 , and Boehmer et al., 1991 . The advantages of Savickas' approach are emphasized by the results obtained by Babalan and Constantinou (2005) . In the existing event studies in energy and environmental economics, however, this approach has not been employed, yet. Moreover, to our knowledge, there is no event study available in this discipline that takes conditional heteroskedasticity into account although approaches of the GARCH-class have become standard in financial economics.
Savickas ' (2003) test is based on an estimation framework with
where D t is a dummy variable that equals 1 if for an event day or period t, and 0 otherwise.
The model can accommodate more than one dummy variable that may equal 1 for one or several days, each. In the case of multiple dummy variables, multiple dummy variable coefficients have to be estimated in each equation. In equations (7) and (8), the example of only one event day or period t is shown. Here, the coefficient γ i gives the event (return) effect for firm i. In order to assess an event effect for a sample of firms, the mean of the γ i coefficients over the corporations has to be calculated. d i is the coefficient of the dummy variable D t in the variance equation. Besides the inclusion of the dummy variable(s), the GARCH(1,1) framework is identical to that one used for assessing effects on unsystematic volatility (see equations (1) and (2)).
The cross sectional test statistic t
θ is a refinement of the usual t-statistic which takes intertemporal firm-specific heteroskedasticity into account, and can be calculated according to 
Being the ratio of the estimated mean of abnormal return for each security and of its estimated standard deviation, S i,t is a measure of abnormal (event-induced) returns that accounts for 
Data and Details of the Event Study
As (7) and (8) abnormal returns, equations (7) and (8) (1) and (2) do not require the inclusion of dummy variables. Cumulative abnormal volatility is simply estimated in adding up daily abnormal volatilities from the respective event (announcement / withdrawal) period.
Results
Before proceeding to the event study methods, we briefly check the adequacy of our approaches in testing if autoregressive conditional heteroskedasticity and, therefore, so-called volatility clustering is present in our data set. In order to do this, we employ the common ARCH-LM test (Engle, 1982) . Given that autoregressive conditional heteroskedasticity can be found, our assumption is that a GARCH (1,1) framework should sufficiently capture this phenomenon (cp. chapter 4). Our results are quite clear and suggest that in the great majority of the return series analyzed, volatility clustering occurs. In about 70 per cent of our series, ARCH effects are even highly significant at the 1%-level. For nearly all of the stock returns of our sample, ignoring ARCH effects would imply at least inefficient parameter estimation. For the full sample, the approach formulated by Hilliard and Savickas (2003) that tests for event-induced abnormal unsystematic volatility in the stock returns shows a highly significant event impact on one day analyzed (see Table 4 ). On January 3, 2006, when the withdrawal of the crisis was announced, unsystematic volatility differs highly significantly from its "normal" level. Compared with this baseline, unsystematic volatility rises by 73 per cent. This volatility increase remains significant (at the 5%-level) for the whole event window (crisis withdrawal). For the three days analyzed here, volatility rose by 22 per cent on average. In contrast, unsystematic volatility is very low when the crisis was announced. In the announcement phase between December 28, 2005, and December 30, Cλ t , the estimator of cumulative abnormal volatility suggests that unsystematic volatility falls more than 50 per 6 The results of the ARCH-LM tests are available on request.
cent below its "normal" level (see Table 2 ). What is more, also on December 27 as well as on the crisis day (January 2, 2006), the respective λ t is smaller than one, so that the null hypothesis of no event effect can not be rejected in favour of positive abnormal volatility at any common level (see Tables 1 and 3) . If we distinguish utilities from oil and gas stocks, these results largely hold. Furthermore, we can show that unsystematic volatility on January 3 is quite homogenous over the two groups of stocks. For utilities as well as oil and gas stocks, significant (1%-and 5%-level, respectively) abnormal unsystematic volatility occurs. The respective rise in unsystematic volatility adds up to 69 and 58 per cent, respectively. There are sector-specific effects on January 5, however. Only for the utilities stocks, a significant impact can be observed here.
Compared with the baseline of no event effect, unsystematic volatility rises by 61 per cent. If sector specific abnormal volatility is cumulated over the withdrawal event window, a highly significant impact therefore remains very strong for utilities (45 per cent on average; daily), while we do not get a significant result for oil and gas corporations.
All in all, for each group of firms we observe significant abnormal unsystematic volatility for January 3, 2006. For the full sample as well as for the utilities analyzed, we furthermore get significant cumulative abnormal volatility for the period of crisis resolution. Outside of this period, unsystematic volatility often falls noticeably below its non-event level.
From a methodological point of view, the existence of event-induced volatility at a betweenfirm level confirms our choice of the methodology of Savickas (2003) in order to test for abnormal returns. Traditional tests would be misspecified under such conditions. As outlined in chapter 4 of this paper, the methodology applied here takes into account event-induced variance increases and especially volatility effects that differ across the firms analyzed. Tables 6 and 8 ). These effects are both positive and significant at the 1%-, and 10%-level, respectively. On
December 28, we observe (daily) abnormal returns of 0.35 per cent for the full sample, while for January 4, these abnormal returns are smaller (0.31 per cent). When abnormal returns are analyzed cumulatively, a significant impact (at the 5%-level) can only be observed for the crisis announcement period. The abnormal average cumulative daily effect on stock returns is 0.14 per cent. 
Conclusion
In this paper, the impact of the 2006 European gas crisis on West European utilities is measured from a stock market perspective. Using event study methodology, we assess whether or not the Russian announcement of suspension of gas deliveries, this suspension itself as well as its withdrawal, implied higher volatility and abnormal returns for West European energy stocks. In the field of resource, energy and environmental economics this is, to our knowledge, the first paper measuring event impacts on unsystematic return volatility as well as generally considering autoregressive conditional heteroskedasticity and event-induced volatility for the calculation and significance testing of abnormal returns.
From a methodological point of view, the existence of event-induced volatility at a betweenfirm level confirms our choice of the flexible methodology of Savickas (2003) in order to test for abnormal returns. The important issue of risk and volatility was neglected in resource and environmental economics so far, and tests for abnormal returns based on the traditional event study literature are misspecified under such circumstances. We therefore suggest that eventinduced volatility should more often be taken into account in event studies in environmental and resource economics.
We find positive significant abnormal returns for the phase when the 2006 European gas crisis came within reach and became more concrete. This effect is especially pronounced and robust for December 28, 2005, the day when Russia definitely announced the gas transmission suspension. The very consistent -and positive -assessment of the crisis announcement is underpinned by the fact that cross-sectional volatility is very low during that phase,
suggesting that there was a large consensus and few uncertainty among financial market agents that the European energy-related industry could profit from such a crisis. The fact that the positive return impact is relatively modest may be due to a possible partly anticipation of the crisis given Gasprom's longer-lasting threat of gas price increases.
It seems that these positive financial markets reactions on the crisis announcement fully anticipated the supply suspension as no abnormal returns can be measured when the withdrawal was implemented -from January 1 to January 2. We observe (highly) significant abnormal unsystematic volatility on January 3, 2006, when Russia reopened its valves which means that the crisis resolution induced insecurity in the financial market assessment of energy firms. On January 4, a positive effect is visible for the whole sample, which can be explained with the legally binding ending of the conflict. However, these effects are small, only significant at the 10%-level, and do not manifest in significant cumulative abnormal returns for the whole "withdrawal phase".
Summarizing, the definite announcement of the crisis as well as of price increases and therefore a rise of Western Europe's energy risk and costs tended to increase market expectations with respect to energy-related firms and especially oil and gas corporations while the renewal of gas deliveries increased market uncertainty. The -often large -oil and gas stocks of the European suppliers are upvalued due to the fundamental resource price increases at the international exchanges. This is quite in line with the existing empirical evidence on the relationship between resource prices and energy stocks (Huang et al., 1996, Boyer and Filion, 2007) . The effect does not only hold for oil and gas companies that directly gain from price increases due to a revaluation of resource deposits and stocks. Utilities may profit as well. The most important factor behind this finding could be windfall profits of utilities due to increasing electricity prices. Sources of energy production other than oil and gas are available and utilities can at least partly switch between those sources.
Generally, it could well be that energy companies tend to raise their markup in the wake of bad news. This point is emphasized by the fact that demand elasticities for energy are extremely low as a rule, so that price increases can often easily be passed on to the consumers.
Finally, the stock market effect observed may reflect the expectation of energy-related industries that future energy policy, e.g. via competition policy, could increasingly take into account their interests as a reaction to their ostensible dependence or even instability. In contrast, our analysis on unsystematic volatility suggests that during our event windows, insecurity is only induced in the financial market assessment of the energy sector the days the gas crisis was withdrawn. We attribute this finding to the fact that this crisis resolution did not severely lower resource and electricity prices immediately. However, it created the potential for an energy price drop in the near future. This is especially underpinned by the fact that unsystematic volatility is highest on December 3, 2006, the day the crisis withdrawal was announced.
All in all, our results suggest that energy policy does not have to bear in mind negative effects for energy-related firms in situations when security of energy supply is in danger. In contrast, our findings indicate that the energy sector may even profit from energy crises that induce resource price hikes. Given this, it is far from surprising that policy generally considers energy supply as a matter of public concern that should not fully be left to the strategic calculus of private companies.
